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MOVING VIOLATIONS: VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CERCLA'S 
FEDERALLY PERMITTED RELEASE EXCEPTION 
Amy E. Fortenberry* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Operation of the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the 
inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other) indicates that if a permit 
allows the discharge of pollutants A, B, and C, then the discharge by 
the same point source of pollutant D is a violation of the permit 
conditions.! Recently, however, defendants with National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)2 permits have argued that 
the Clean Water Act3 should be interpreted to mean that their permit 
to discharge pollutants A, B, and C from a certain point source in-
cludes implicit authorization to discharge pollutant D from the same 
point source.4 Accordingly, defendants could declare all their discharges, 
* Managing Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
I owe a special thanks to Chip and Elizabeth Fortenberry, Marya Rose, Pete Brassard, Profes-
sor Zygmunt J. B. Plater, John Gordon, and friends at Keller & Heckman for their support and 
patience. 
1 See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying canon 
to prove that where definition of pollutant excludes water, gas, or other materials injected into 
wells for oil or gas production, the materials are pollutants if injected into wells under any other 
circumstances). 
233 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). Unless otherwise specified, all United States Code citations refer to 
the 1994 edition and the 1996 Supplement. 
3 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 
896 (1972), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)). 
4 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 365 (2d Cir. 1993); In 
re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893, 895 & n.2 (D. Mass. 1989) 
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and the resulting environmental harm, to be federally permitted re-
leases immune from action under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).5 
The United States Department of the Interior posed the above 
scenario to the Boston College Environmental Mfairs Law Review. 
In order to pursue natural resource damages claims under CERCLA 
for damages to a body of water, the Department of the Interior 
needed proof that such a claim was possible. The recent decision of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Atlantic 
States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak), al-
though specific to Clean Water Act violations, had made questionable 
what degree of compliance with a NPDES permit would immunize a 
discharge as a federally permitted release under CERCLA.6 This 
Comment addresses those questions. 
Section II reviews the statutory background and legislative history 
of the Clean Water Act, specifically the NPDES permitting process. 
Section III reviews the common law to determine the elements req-
uisite to a Clean Water Act violation. Section IV presents the decision 
in Kodak. Section V renders an analysis of the proscriptions of the 
Clean Water Act and NPDES. Section VI analyzes the Kodak deci-
sion in light of the statutory and common law, and, in particular, the 
preceding analysis. Section VII analyzes the relationship between 
CERCLA and the Clean Water Act in order to determine whether 
they may be used in conjunction with each other. Section VIII lays 
out the relevant statutory and common law background of CERCLA. 
Section IX concludes with an analysis of whether CERCLA recovery 
may be obtained where the harm is the result of a Clean Water Act 
violation. 
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19727 
(Clean Water Act) established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
(Acushnet VII); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp. 827, 832 (D. Idaho 1987), a/I'd, 882 F.2d 
392 (9th Cir. 1989). 
5 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-510, § 101,94 Stat. 2767, as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 101, 114(b), 127(a), Title V, § 517(c)(2), 100 Stat. 1615, 1652, 1692, 
1774 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994»; see also Acushnet VII, 722 
F. Supp. at 895 & n.2.; Hanna Mining, 699 F. Supp. at 832. 
6 Kodak, 12 F.3d at 365. 
7 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 
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nation System (NPDES).8 This system is founded on a regulatory 
approach that combines a limit on industrial discharges with water 
quality standards for receiving waters.9 The cornerstone of the Clean 
Water Act, NPDES is a system of permitting and enforcement that 
balances the waste disposal needs of an industrialized nation with a 
need for fishable, swimmable, clean waters.lO The self-proclaimed ob-
jective of the Clean Water Act was "To restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,"l1 
and NPDES was viewed as the most effective tool to do so. The 
"integrity" of water protected by the Act has been defined as the state 
in which a water body is able to maintain ecological diversity as 
well as to support human life, which includes the needs of an indus-
trialized, urban society.12 Paradoxically, however, the needs of an in-
dustrialized society appear to be in conflict with the original goals of 
the Clean Water Act, which had aimed for "zero discharge" by 1985.13 
Although it is over a decade since the goal has gone unmet, NPDES 
remains ambitious to restore, or at least maintain, the Nation's wa-
ters.14 
The goal of zero discharge has not been abandoned wholly. It is 
reflected in effluent limitations and technology requirements geared 
toward the phasing out, and ultimately, the elimination of the dis-
charge of all pollutants.15 Clean water is an issue that is fraught with 
controversy. The needs of an industrialized nation are not necessarily 
in concert with the people's aesthetic preferences for fishable, swim-
mable waters.16 The Clean Water Act, passed on a wave of Congres-
sional idealism, asserts that waste disposal, no matter how incidental 
896 (1972), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994» [hereinafter Clean Water ActJ. 
833 U.S.C. § 1342. 
9 See D. Brennen Keene, Comment, The Inconsistency of Virginia's Execution of the NPDES 
Permit Program: The Foreclosure of Citizen Attorneys General from State and Federal Courts, 
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 715, 719 (1995). 
10 See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 143 (1984). 
11 33 U.S.C. § 1251; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 
F.2d 156, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that "Congress viewed the NPDES program as its most 
effective weapon against pollution"). 
12 See Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 143. 
13 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1975). 
14 See Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 143. 
15 See id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). 
16 See Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 143. 
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to industrialized progress, is a right that may allocated only by gov-
ernment-and that favor is a temporary one: 
This legislation would clearly establish that no one has the right 
to pollute-that pollution continues because of technological lim-
its, not because of any inherent rights to use the nation's water-
ways for the purpose of disposing of wastesP 
A. NPDES 
1. The Iron Grip of Section 1311 
Under NPDES, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regu-
lates the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters18 of the 
United States by issuing discharge permits.19 EPA's issuance of a 
NPDES permit is contingent upon the prospective discharger's com-
pliance with several provisions of the Clean Water Act.20 
The primary hurdle for any NPDES permit is § 1311 of the Clean 
Water Act, which addresses standards and enforcement of effluent 
limitations.21 Section 1311 was promulgated with the "national goal of 
eliminating the discharge of all pollutants."22 The mandate of § 1311 
is that "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlaw-
ful," except where the discharger discharges in compliance with a 
§ 1342 permit.23 The Clean Water Act defines "discharge of a pollut-
ant" as "any addition of any pollutant24 to navigable waters from any 
17 s. REP. No. 92--414, at 42 (1971), reprinted in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIV., CONGo REF. 
SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
1972, at 1460 (S. Pub. Works Comm. Print 1973); 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3709; NRDC v. Costle, 
568 F.2d 1369, 1375 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
18 The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the United States, including the territo-
rial seas. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The term "navigable waters" has been interpreted consistently 
in the case law to encompass virtually all bodies of water in the United States, including those 
streams not technically "navigable." See Section III.A.4. infra. 
19 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(I); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 767 (S.D. 
Ohio 1988). 
20 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). A discharge authorized by a NPDES permit must meet "all 
applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this chapter" 
or such conditions the EPA "determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
chapter." [d. 
21 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
22 [d. § 1311(b)(2)(A). 
23 [d. § 1311(a) (emphasis added). 
24 "The term 'p.ollutant' means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, gar-
bage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, 
heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rocks, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and 
agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). 
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point source,25 where a point source is "any conveyance ... from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged."26 
It may appear circular to declare that § 1342 NPDES permits must 
comply with § 1311 and that § 1311 only allows discharges under the 
guise of § 1342.27 However, the intertwining of § 1342 and § 1311 lays 
out that discharge of pollutants is expressly prohibited unless the 
type and quantity of the pollutants, as well as the source of the 
discharge, are authorized by a NPDES permit.28 
2. Exempt Activities 
All pollutants discharged from point sources are governed by 
NPDES.29 States are charged with regulating discharges emanating 
from non-point sources, which are "defined by exclusion and include 
all water quality problems not subject to § 1342."30 Generally, activi-
ties that do not involve point source discharge and that are adequately 
controlled by management practices are excluded from NPDES cov-
erage.31 Discharges stemming from agriculture,32 sylvaculture, and 
25 "The term 'discharge of a pollutant' means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous 
zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft." Id. 
§ 1362(12). 
26 "The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including 
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include return flows from irrigated 
agriculture." Id. § 1362(14) (emphasis added). 
27 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. 
28 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. "All discharges are presumed to be violations of the public's 
right to clean water where ever attainable unless Congress allows a temporary right to dis-
charge because of the unavailability of feasible control technology, or a more permanent dis-
charge right based on receiving water quality or overriding economic factors." Goldfarb, supra 
note 10, at 143. 
29 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (declaring "if what 
are involved are point sources, they will be subject to permits under the [§ 1342] program"); 
see also Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp. 827, 832 (D. Idaho 1987), aff'd, 882 F.2d 392 
(9th Cir. 1989); Statement of Senator Muskie, Aug. 4, 1977, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, VOL. 4, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., 929 (Comm. Print No. 95--14, 
1978), microfarmed on CIS No. 78-S322-1O (Congressional Info. Serv.) [hereinafter LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 4]. The EPA may promulgate regulations establishing certain exempted catego-
ries of point sources, distinguished by class, type, and size. See 32 U.S.C. § 1342(t). 
30 Statement of Senator Muskie, Aug. 4, 1977, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 4, supra note 29. 
31 Senate Debate, Dec. 15, 1977, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT OF 1977, VOL. 3, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., 529 (Comm. Print No. 95--14, 1978), micro formed 
on CIS No. 78-S322-9 (Congressional Info. Serv.) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3]. 
32 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1)(1). 
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certain types of storm water runoff are examples of excluded dis-
charges.33 However, if an otherwise exempt activity introduces toxic 
materials into navigable waters, the discharger must obtain a NPDES 
permit.34 This check on otherwise exempt activities highlights the 
seriousness of the Act.35 Exceptions to NPDES coverage are nar-
rowly defined in order to safeguard the integrity of the Nation's 
waters.36 While the narrow exceptions to coverage further the pur-
poses of the Act, the most substantial checks for restoring and main-
taining the Nation's waters are water quality standards and effluent 
limitations as imposed under NPDES.37 
3. Water Quality Standards 
The regulatory approach of the Clean Water Act combines the Act's 
considerations of receiving water quality with restrictions on dis-
charges at their source.38 Water quality standards are criteria allow-
ing for the presence of pollutants. The criteria may be either quanti-
tative or descriptive and are specific to a defined water segment.39 
Quantitative standards restrict pollutants to certain parts per million 
per X milliliters of water.40 Descriptive standards refer to the appear-
ance of the water. For example, descriptive standards may require 
the water to be a certain hue or to be free from floating scum.41 
States are required by the Clean Water Act to promulgate intra-
state water quality standards that meet the approval of EPA.42 If a 
state fails to produce such standards or fails to revise its draft stand-
33 See id. §§ 1314(1), 1342(1)(2). 
34 See id. § 1342(1)(2); S. REP. No. 95-370, at 73 (1977). 
35 See S. REP. No. 95-370, at 52 (1977); Senate Debate, Dec. 15, 1977, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
3, supra note 31; President's Statement on Signing H.R. 3199 into Law, Dec. 28, 1977, reprinted 
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3, supra note 31; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 
156, 165 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that if the release of entrained fish by a dam was found 
to constitute a "discharge" of a pollutant, then EPA would be required to regulate dams because 
the EPA may not issue a categorical exemption from NPDES permit requirements). 
36 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 1988); 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 166; Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp. 
827, 832 (D. Idaho 1987), aff'd, 882 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1989). 
37 See Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 145. 
38 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 252-54, 259-62 (2d ed. 1994) cited in 
Keene, supra note 9, at 719 (discussing the origins of the philosophical conflict between the 
absolutist effluent limitations approach and the relativist water quality standards approach). 
39 See RODGERS, supra note 38, at 343. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313. 
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ards in accordance with EPA recommendations, EPA must promul-
gate water quality standards for that state.43 State water quality 
standards are commonly in the form of narrative criteria.44 Most re-
quire a state's waters to be free from: 
(1) substances that will cause the formation of putrescent or oth-
erwise objectionable bottom deposits; (2) oil, scum, and floating 
debris in amounts that are unsightly or deleterious; (3) materials 
that cause odor, color, or other conditions in such a degree as to 
cause a nuisance; (4) substances in concentrations or combinations 
harmful or toxic to humans or aquatic life.45 
Additionally, the Clean Water Act requires states to designate planned 
uses of the state's waters and to have such designations approved by 
EPA.46 Designated uses are typically designations of waters as suit-
able for recreation, propagation of fish, and transportation of sewage 
and industrial wastes "without nuisance."47 Ultimately, the water seg-
ment must be able to support and ensure propagation of a balanced 
population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife.48 
States must identify areas where effluent limitations do not pro-
duce the desired water quality standard for a water's use designa-
tion.49 For example, where a river designated for recreation trans-
ports sewage waste or toxic pollutants and is not fishable or swimmable, 
the state must design segment-specific control strategies to reduce 
concentrations of toxic pollutants to the level that will sustain the 
water quality standards for the receiving waters.50 For each contami-
nated water segment, the state must also make a determination of 
which point sources prevented the segment from meeting its desig-
nated use and must ascertain the amount of each toxic pollutant 
discharged at each point source.51 
The state's control strategies may include a combination of strict 
effluent limitations and water quality standards imposed upon each 
43 See id. 
44 See RODGERS, supra note 38, at 344. 
45 RODGERS, supra note 38, at 344 (citing EPA, Criteria and Standards Division, Standards 
Branch, State Water Quality for Toxics, Oct. 1984, at 2, and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 
v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (water quality criteria "may be, and often are, wholly 
narrative")). 
46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(B). 
47 Keene, supra note 9, at 721 (citing RODGERS, supra note 38, at 344 n.7). 
48 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
49 See id. § 1314(1)(A)-(C). 
50 See id. § 1314(!)(1)(D). 
51 See id. § 1314(!)(1)(C). 
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offending point source.52 One control strategy allows states to desig-
nate total maximum daily loads for certain water segments when it is 
apparent that existing effluent limitations are inadequate to enable 
the water segment to meet state water quality standards. 53 The result 
of designating total maximum daily loads, however, may be to assign 
pollution rights to individual dischargers, in contradiction to the long-
term goals of the Clean Water Act.54 
The use of water quality standards as a regulatory mechanism has 
traditionally been supported by those who believe "the solution to 
pollution is dilution," i.e., water is both capable of digesting and is the 
appropriate receptacle for the disposal of waste. 55 Congress may have 
instituted the water quality provisions of the Clean Water Act as 
contingent planning in the event that the no discharge objective had 
to be "abandoned in favor of basin level allocations of assimilative 
capacity."56 Nonetheless, water quality standards may, in practice, be 
more stringent than their counterpart of effluent limitations, which 
directly prohibit or restrict discharges.57 
4. Effluent Limitations 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Costle, a 
ruling contemporaneous with the Act, noted that a primary purpose 
of effluent limitations is to ensure uniformity among federal and state 
jurisdictions enforcing NPDES.53 Otherwise, the nation might be faced 
with a "Tragedy of the Commons" scenario if jurisdictions could com-
pete among themselves for industry and development by offering 
52 See id. § 1314(1)(1)(D). 
53 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A). Maximum daily loads are commonly expressed in terms of 
pounds per day of certain pollutants, such as suspended solids or nitrogen. See WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 421 (1st ed. 1977) [hereinafter RODGERS, 1ST ED.]. The 
Act requires that a determination of maximum loads reflect a "margin of safety which takes 
into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and 
water quality." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). This may be read as requiring an administrative 
prediction that particular load reductions will yield the desired water quality. See RODGERS, 1ST 
ED., supra, at 422. 
54 See RODGERS, 1ST ED., supra note 53, at 420. 
55 RODGERS, supra note 38, at 261; Lecture of Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Professor of 
Environmental Law, Boston College Law School (Feb. 8, 1996). 
56 RODGERS, 1ST ED., supra note 53, at 420. 
57 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312; RODGERS, supra note 38, at 261. 
58 See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.3d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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more lenient discharge requirements59 in a "race of laxity."60 Because 
NPDES permits must comply with § 1311, and because § 1311 man-
dates compliance with § 1312, which provides for water quality stand-
ards, NPDES effluent limitations permits go hand-in-hand with state 
water quality standards.61 "A permit thus transforms 'generally ap-
plicable effluent limitations and other standards, including those based 
on water quality-into obligations ... of the individual discharger."'62 
a. Standard of Regulation 
The NPDES standard of regulation requires dischargers to apply 
"the best available technology economically achievable ... which will 
result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of 
eliminating the discharge of all pollutants."63 EPA bases effluent limi-
tations upon industry-categorized guidelines and standards.64 EPA 
asserts that "[a]n effluent limitation must be a precise number in 
order for it to be an effective regulatory tool; both the discharger and 
the regulatory agency need to have an identifiable standard upon 
which to determine whether the facility is in compliance."65 
59 See id. (quoting Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211 (1977». 
The Tragedy of the Commons arises in noncentralized decisionmaking under conditions 
in which the rational but independent pursuit by each decisionmaker of its own self-
interest leads to results that leave all decisionmakers worse off than they would have 
been had they been able to agree collectively on a different set of policies. 
Id. at 1378 n.19. 
60 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 726-27 (1992) [hereinafter PLATER, NLS]. The Clean Water Act was one of the 
environmental statutes implemented to curb the "race of laxity," manifested as industrial flight 
(or threats of) from those states that sought to strenuously enforce environmental protection 
laws to those states that sought to bolster their local economies by permissiveness in waste 
disposal. The Clean Water Act halted the race of laxity by imposing uniform national pollutant 
standards which all states must either meet or, at their discretion, exceed. See id. 
6! See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (b)(I)(C); NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1380 n.21. "The term 'effluent 
limitations' means any restriction established by a State or the Administrator [of EPA] on 
quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents 
which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous 
zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). 
62 United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing EPA v. California 
ex reI. State Water Resources Control Ed., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976». 
63 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(AHC), (F). 
64 See 40 C.F.R. § 122 (1994). 
65 NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1378. While the District of Columbia Circuit stated that there 
need not be uniform effluent limitations prior to EPA's issuance of a permit, that aspect of the 
decision must be viewed in its historical context: EPA had not finished promulgating national 
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EPA effluent limitations must "assure protection of public health, 
public water supplies, agricultural and industrial uses, and the pro-
tection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, fish and 
wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the water."66 If a 
permit holder's discharge fails to allow for fishable, swimmable wa-
ters, EPA must apply more stringent effluent limitations to the per-
mit.67 A NPDES permit holder must also comply with the state's 
water quality standards even if compliance would require more strin-
gent controls than application of the best available technology.68 
b. Criteria for Regulation 
A NPDES permit prohibits the discharge of all pollutants from a 
point source that are technologically and economically feasible to elimi-
nate.69 When establishing effluent limitations, including prohibitions 
on the discharge of certain toxic pollutants, EPA must consider: 
the toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, degradability, the 
usual or potential presence of the affected organisms in any wa-
ters, the importance of the affected organisms and the nature and 
extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms, and 
the extent to which effective control is being or may be achieved 
under other regulatory authority.7o 
Effluent limitations are evidence that all discharges are presumed 
to be violations of the public's right to clean water.71 The only excep-
effluent limitations by 1977. See id. at 1378-79. Whether the court's language could be taken to 
mean that EPA could issue a permit in the absence of uniform national effluent limitations is 
best viewed in light of the provisions of the Act addressing permit modification. 
6633 U.S.C. § 1312(a). 
67 See id. § 1312; RODGERS, supra note 38, at 261 (calling § 1312 "a dead letter" and the goal 
of fishable, swimmable water "a broken resolution"). Contra GOLDFARB, supra note 10, at 
142-43. 
ld. 
"[F]ishability-swimmability" is both a goal and a requirement, but only "where attain-
able." That the goals are not quixotic is shown by the restoration of important water-
bodies to fishable-swimmable status and the attainment, or prospective attainment, of 
zero discharge by major categories of industry. The [Clean Water Act] should not be 
condemned as a failure because the 1983 and 1985 [statutory goals for zero discharge 
and fishable-swimmable waters were] unachievable by those dates .... It has been 
learned since 1972 that water pollution control is more complicated and expensive than 
was first anticipated. Thus, it is no disgrace to postpone fulfilling some of our goals .... 
68 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C); RODGERS, supra note 38, at 261. 
69 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). The EPA determines technological and economic feasibility. 
See id. 
70 ld. § 1317(a)(2). 
71 See Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 143. 
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tion is where Congress allows a temporary right to discharge because 
of unavailability of feasible control technology, or a more permanent 
right to discharge based upon receiving water quality or economic 
pressures.72 
B. SPDES 
While EPA administers the NPDES program, EPA certifies states 
to administer State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) 
programs under the umbrella of NPDES.73 EPA administers the 
NPDES permitting program in each state unless and until the state 
assumes the responsibility by creating its own SPDES.74 
A SPDES permit incorporates the requirements of and has the 
same effect as a federally issued NPDES permit.75 State permits, 
however, may contain stricter effluent limitations than a NPDES 
permit, such as limitations based on state water quality standards.76 
Under SPDES, however, a state may not grant permits with stand-
ards that are less stringent or that deviate from those imposed by 
NPDES.77 
A state may apply to EPA for authorization of its SPDES program 
by submitting an application detailing the state's proposed program.78 
For EPA to authorize the SPDES program, the state must demon-
strate that it has the authority to issue permits that comply with the 
Clean Water Act.79 The state must pledge to enforce permit conditions 
and to punish violations of the permit program with civil and/or crimi-
nal penalties.80 
72 See id. 
73 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
74 See id. § 1342(b); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977). 
75 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3), (b), (k); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 
767 (S.D. Ohio 1988). For the purpose of this Comment and except where otherwise noted, 
"NPDES permit" or "permit" refers to both NPDES and SPDES permits. 
76 See Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 1993); 
U.S. Steel, 556 F.2d at 838-39; Keene, supra note 9, at 725 n.69 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1370 and 
stating that because the statute precludes any state effluent standard or control or abatement 
requirement which is less stringent than the federal requirements, by implication, a state may 
set standards more stringent than federal standards). 
77 See Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 324, 328 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding 
EPA's refusal to certify SPDES permits where the state granted permit terms less stringent 
than those required by EPA). 
78 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). For a thorough description EPA's authorization of SPDES pro-
grams and a state's subsequent role under NPDES, see Keene, supra note 9, at 715-29. 
79 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(I). 
80 See id. § 1342(b )(7). 
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Moreover, the state must assure EPA that it will fulfill federal 
requirements for administration of the SPDES program.81 An appli-
cant state must convince EPA that the state can fulfill the inspection, 
monitoring, and record-keeping requirements of the Act.82 Also, the 
state must provide notice and comment periods as well as an oppor-
tunity for a public hearing to the public and affected states prior to 
making final decisions on permit applications.83 The state is required 
to notify EPA of any proposed permit and to provide EPA with copies 
of the same.84 Within ninety days after being notified of a proposed 
SPDES permit, EPA may object to the state's issuance of the permit, 
thereby denying the permit.85 However, in its authorization of a SPDES 
program, EPA may elect to waive all or a portion of its right to be 
notified.86 
C. Permitting 
A discharger may obtain a permit by applying to the appropriate 
SPDES or NPDES program, which may then hold a review of the 
application at a public hearing.87 A permit is point source specific.88 It 
sets out the conditions that the permittee must meet in order to 
comply with the law and the terms by which its discharge is allow-
able.89 
A permit may be modified or terminated "for cause" if the permit-
tee violates a permit condition or presents false or misleading infor-
mation in the permit application process.90 A permit may also be 
modified or terminated due to any change that necessitates either a 
temporary or permanent reduction or elimination of the permitted 
discharge.91 
81 See id. § 1342(c). 
82 See id. § 1342(b)(2)(A)-(B). 
83 See id. § 1342(b)(3)-(5). 
84 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(4). 
85 See id. § 1342( d)(2). 
86 See id. § 1342(dHe). 
87 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States 
Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977). For a description of NPDES procedures 
for notice, comment, and public hearings, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.10-.74 (1994). For summaries and 
comparisons of NPDES and SPDES permit application and review procedures, see Keene, 
supra note 9, at 722-24. 
88 NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
89 See Keene, supra note 9, at 722. "The discharger must satisfy the effluent limitations, water 
quality related effluent limitations, water quality standards, national standards of performance 
for new sources, toxic and pretreatment effluent standards, and ocean discharge criteria." [d. 
90 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(I)(C). 
91 See id. 
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D. Permit Modification and Anti-Backsliding 
The NPDES provisions of the Act place a general prohibition on 
the modification or reissuance of any NPDES permit with less strin-
gent effluent limitations than those contained in the original permit.92 
The only exceptions to this "anti-backsliding" provision are where: 
(1) material alterations are made to the discharging facility, thereby 
requiring less stringent limitations; (2) information, other than re-
vised regulations, is made available which would have justified less 
stringent limitations at the time of issuance; (3) events over which the 
permittee has no control and for which there is no remedy so mandate; 
or (4) the permittee receives a permit modification pursuant to §§ 1311 
or 1326.93 In § 1311, the Act sets out requirements for obtaining a 
modification of an existing permit or waivers for certain pollutants.94 
Section 1311(1) expressly forbids EPA to modify any permit require-
ments pertaining to those toxic pollutants specified in the Act.95 
Section 1342's prohibition against the issuance of less stringent 
permits reflects Congress's intent to reduce and control the discharge 
of pollutants, without the risk of undermining by EPA action.96 This 
backstop on EPA is also reflected in the anti-backsliding provision 
that provides that permits may not be revised and made less strin-
gent simply on the basis of regulations revised and promulgated sub-
sequent to the issuance of the permits.97 Revised regulations may 
impact existing permits, however, if the administering agency (the 
state or EPA) concludes that the designated use of a water segment 
is not being met. Regulations revised and made more stringent in 
order to attain a water's designated use may be imposed upon existing 
permits.96 The anti-backsliding provisions of the Act also allow for 
revision of an effluent limitation, water quality standard, or a permit 
standard if the designated use of a water segment is being met or 
exceeded such that the revision would still allow the water body to 
meet its designated use.99 In no case, however, may EPA revise regu-
lations so as to allow a discharger or dischargers to hamper attain-
ment of a water segment's designated use.100 
92 See id. § 1342(0). 
93 See id. § 1342(0)(2). 
94 See id. § 1311. 
95 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(1) (referring to toxic pollutant list under § 1317(a)(I». 
96 See id. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A); 1342(0)(2)(B)(I). 
9'1 See id. § 1342(0)(2). 
98 See id. § 1313(d)(4). 
99 See id. 
100 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(4); 1342(0)(2)(B) (anti-backsliding). 
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E. Reporting Requirements 
EPA has discretion to prescribe those conditions that will be im-
posed upon each individual discharger through each NPDES permit.10l 
The standard permit consists of a combination of effluent limitations 
and water quality standards in addition to reporting requirements.102 
Nonetheless, it is within EPA's discretion to issue a permit for which 
the sole requirements are data collection and reporting. lOS 
F. Civil and Criminal Penalties 
NPDES permits are strictly construed and enforced.104 Under the 
Act, EPA or a state may bring a civil actionl05 seeking relief and/or 
civil penalties against any person in violation of any permit condition 
or limitation under the Act.106 The "appropriate relief" EPA may seek 
in a civil action includes a permanent or temporary injunction.lo7 
Willful or negligent violation of any permit condition or limitation 
is a felony, subject to criminal penalties.108 The polluter's knowing 
violation of the Clean Water Act need not meet the traditional com-
mon law test for knowledge of wrongdoing; rather, the discharger 
need only knowingly have engaged in conduct that led to a Clean 
Water Act violation.109 
Criminal penalties include a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more 
than $25,000 per day per violation and/or imprisonment for not more 
101 See id. § 1342(a)(2). 
102 See id. §§ 1318, 1342. 
103 See id. § 1342(a)(2); NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("It may be 
appropriate in certain circumstances for the EPA to require a permittee simply to monitor and 
report effluent levels; EPA manifestly has this authority."). 
104 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319. 
105 The citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act involve complexities which are beyond 
the scope of this Comment. For the citizen suit provisions of the Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
106 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l), (3), (d). 
107 See id. § 1319(b). 
108 See id. § 1319(c); see, e.g., United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 978 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming 
felony conviction of Lewis Law and Mine Management, Inc., for knowingly discharging polluted 
water into certain creeks in the absence of a NPDES permit), denial of Habeas Corpus aff'd, 
16 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 1994). 
109 See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir.1993). The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is one of the few courts to have reviewed the issue. In 
Weitzenhoff, regarding publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), the Ninth Circuit further 
found that it is irrelevant that defendants mistakenly believed their conduct to be authorized 
under a § 1342 permit. See id. For a further discussion of this issue, including contradictory case 
law, see Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The 
Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165 (1995). 
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than one year.ll0 Repeat offenders are subject to a fine up to $50,000 
per day of violation and the threat of imprisonment for up to two 
years.111 For example, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York has held that the unpermitted discharge of 
pollutants constitutes a violation of the Clean Water Act for every 
day that the pollutants remain in the waterway.112 
Violations of reporting or data collection requirements are equally 
serious violations of the Act: 
Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, repre-
sentation, or certification in any application, record, report, plan, 
or other document filed or required to be maintained under this 
chapter or who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders in-
accurate any monitoring device or method required to be main-
tained under this chapter, shall upon conviction, be punished by a 
fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more 
than six months, or by both.ll3 
Like the compromise between industry and environmentalists over 
water quality standards and effluent limitations, the largely self-po-
licing nature of reporting requirements is a nod to industry that 
nonetheless serves as teeth in NPDES.l14 The steep fines, and par-
ticularly the threat to executives of imprisonment for a white-collar 
crime, are designed to make the permitting program more than a 
nominal exercise for industry.115 
III. VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
A. Lack of a Permit 
The case law has established that a discharger who discharges 
pollutants into navigable waters from a point source in the absence of 
110 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1); Weitzenhoff. 1 F.3d at 1529. 
111 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). 
112 See Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. Arcuri, 862 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
113 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). 
114 See id. § 1319; RODGERS, supra note 38, at 261. 
115 See Steven Ferrey, Hard Time: Criminal Prosecution for Polluters, in PLATER, NLS, 
supra note 60, at 330, 332-33. "Despite practical problems, criminal prosecution has assumed 
center stage in environmental enforcement. For an executive, the prospect of incarceration with 
violent felons focuses the attention like few other sanctions .... [While] the economics of waste 
disposal tempts many to ignore the laws governing proper waste handling and disposal, ... until 
the corporation also can serve time, criminal prosecution of individual corporate executives will 
remain the most potent weapon in the expanding arsenal of environmental enforcement." [d. 
at 333. 
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a NPDES permit is liable for a violation of the Clean Water ActY6 
Whether a violation has occurred depends upon four elements: 
(1) Whether the discharge is a pollutant; (2) Whether the pollutant 
was added to the waters by the discharger; (3) Whether the discharge 
emanated from a point source; and (4) Whether the receiving waters 
are part of the Nation's navigable waters.1l7 With few exceptions, 
NPDES has been broadly construed to embrace the fullest construc-
tion possible of the terms "pollutant," "addition of a pollutant," "point 
source," and "navigable waters."118 
1. Pollutant 
Even where defendants have assumed that their activities did not 
require permits, courts have imputed liability for defendants' failure 
to obtain a permit to discharge the specific pollutant complained of.119 
The reach of NPDES liability is illustrated by its extension to the 
discharge of gasoline.120 In the landmark case of United States v. 
Hamel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
deemed gasoline a pollutant in spite of gasoline's absence from the 
Clean Water Act's definition of pollutant.121 The defendants put forth 
a strong argument that their discharge did not subject them to NPDES 
liability, arguing that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a corollary of the 
Clean Water Act, has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue.122 The 
116 See, e.g., United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 978 (4th Cir. 1992); Hudson River Fishermen's 
Ass'n, 862 F. Supp. at 76. 
117 See National Wildlife Fed'n v, Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (reasoning that 
a discharger must have a permit if the following five elements are present: (1) a pollutant is (2) 
added (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source). For clarity, this Comment treats the 
test as requiring only four elements because "addition of a pollutant" and "from" a point source 
are answered by the same evaluation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
in National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., declined to address whether all point 
sources necessarily add pollution, but, while acknowledging the above five elements, called the 
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch court's reasoning "circular" for assuming that "point 
source" may not be defined independently of "addition." See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consum-
ers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988). 
118 See, e.g., Consumers Power,862 F.2d at 583, 585; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 
F.2d 156, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110--11 (6th Cir. 1977). 
119 See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 583, 585 (finding that entrained fish discharged by dam 
are pollutants under Clean Water Act because they are "biological materials"); National Wild-
life Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174 n.56 (declaring that sediment discharged by dam is a 
pollutant under Clean Water Act, although not clearly listed by EPA as such); Hamel, 551 F.2d 
at 110--11 (holding that gasoline is a pollutant under Clean Water Act even though not expressly 
covered under Act). 
120 See Hamel, 551 F.2d at 110--11. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
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court reasoned, however, that gasoline could be classified under the 
pollutant category of "biologic materials" within the Clean Water Act: 
We do not read [Congress's] failure to [list gasoline as a specific 
pollutant under the Clean Water Act] as an intent to exclude 
[petroleum-based] materials from the Act. On the contrary, we 
conceive the employment of the broad generic terms [of the Clean 
Water Act] as an expression of Congressional intent to encompass 
at the minimum what was covered under the Refuse Act of 1899 
[33 U.S.C. § 407].123 
As evidence that Clean Water Act sanctions may be used in conjunc-
tion with other equally applicable environmental statutes, the text 
and history of the Oil Pollution Act state that it is not preemptive of 
other federal remedies, not even of its counterpart, NPDES.l24 
The breadth of the term "pollutant" was made definitive by the 
Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.125 There, the Court 
held that an ordnance dropped during naval exercises was a pollutant 
even though it caused no harm to the receiving waters.126 
Similarly, while cases involving hydroelectric facilities and dams 
have carved a separate regulatory niche for these entities, the case 
law illustrates the seemingly limitless scope of the term "pollutant."127 
"Pollutant" has come to mean almost any material introduced into 
the water, regardless of whether quantities of the alleged pollutant 
already existed in the water prior to the discharge.l28 For example, 
sediment discharged by a dam has been deemed a "pollutant" even 
though sediment is not expressly listed as such in the Act.l29 Similarly, 
seafood processors must have NPDES permits to dispose of seafood 
processing waste even where the discharges are comprised of fish 
removed from local waters.130 Likewise, entrained fish are considered 
"pollutants" because they fall within the realm of ''biological materi-
als," a category of pollutants under the Clean Water Act.l3l Since the 
Clean Water Act does not distinguish between live and dead ''biologi-
123 See id. at 112. 
124 RODGERS, supra note 38, at 382-83. 
125 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 306-08 (1982). 
126 [d. at 309. 
127 See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1988); 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F2d 156, 174 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
128 See, e.g., Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 585; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 
at 174 n.56. 
129 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174 n.56. 
130 See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 585. 
131 See id. at 583. 
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cal materials," even the addition of live fish to a waterway could 
constitute addition of a pollutant.132 
In preserving the separate niche of dams and hydroelectric facili-
ties, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, distinguished 
between the term "pollutant" and water quality changes induced by 
a dam, such as the conditions of low dissolved oxygen, cold, and 
supersaturation.133 In so holding, the court acknowledged that this 
decision conflicted with that of the United States District Court for 
the District of South Carolina in South Carolina Wildlife Federation 
v. Alexander.134 In South Carolina Wildlife Federation, the district 
court had found that low dissolved oxygen constituted a "chemical 
waste," thereby constituting a "pollutant" under the Clean Water 
Act.135 The court reasoned that "no reasonable purpose would be 
served by admitting pollution while denying the existence of a pollut-
ant."136 
The dam and hydroelectric facilities cases particularly illustrate 
that the prohibition on the addition of any material to the Nation's 
waters, even if the material already exists in the waters, serves the 
goal of restoring the Nation's waters.137 Without this prohibition, dis-
chargers could continue to discharge unchecked into polluted water-
ways on the premise that the pollutants already existed in the water-
way.13S The prohibition also reflects the Act's objective in maintaining 
the integrity of the Nation's waters.139 It is a recognition of the fragile 
balance of aquatic life.140 
2. Addition of a Pollutant 
a. Definition of "Addition of a Pollutant" 
EPA defines the term "addition of a pollutant" to mean that which 
occurs when a source "physically introduces a pollutant into water 
from the outside world,"14l including surface water runoff collected or 
132 See id. at 585. 
133 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 171. 
134 See id. at 171 n.47, 172 n.50 (citing South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, No. 
76-2167-2, slip op. at 24 (D.S.C. 1982)). 
135 See id. 
136 South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 125 (D.S.C. 1978). 
137 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
138 See id. 
139 See id. §§ 1251(a), 1311(a). 
140 See id. § 1251(a). 
141 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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channeled by man.142 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power nodded 
to the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in National Wildlife 
Federation v. Gorsuch, and reaffirmed EPA's construction of the term.l43 
Both courts found that Congress had given EPA discretion to define 
"addition" and EPA's construction of the term "addition of a pollutant" 
was reasonable.144 
b. The Dam/Hydroelectric Facilities Cases 145 
While the courts have prohibited EPA from maintaining a categori-
cal exclusion for turbine-generating water from hydroelectric facili-
ties, EPA's ability to define "addition of a pollutant" operates as a 
categorical exclusion for many of the activities of hydroelectric facili-
ties and dams.146 Discharge of operational waste water from hydro-
electric facilities, since such water contains pollutants from the out-
side world, still subjects the facilities to NPDES requirements.147 
The dam and hydroelectric facilities cases have made clear that 
movement of pollutants already in the water does not constitute an 
addition of pollutants to navigable waters of the United States.l48 In 
cases where operators of power plants and dams diverted and then 
released navigable waters, appellate courts have held that the mere 
diversion of flow did not constitute an "addition of pollutant" where 
the pollutants existed in the waters prior to the diversion.149 
3. Point Source 
a. Definition of "Point Source" 
Whether a specific body of water constitutes a point source or 
navigable waters is a matter of law for the courtS.150 While an indus-
142 See Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Utility District, 13 F.3d 305, 308 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (finding that acid drainage from an abandoned mine as smface runoff into river 
constituted "discharge of a pollutant" under the Act). 
143 See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584. 
144 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166, 170, 173, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584. 
145 See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584 (equating dams with hydroelectric facilities). 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 581, 584. 
149 United States v. Law, 979 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 
at 585-86, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Appalachian 
Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1377-78 (4th Cir. 1976». 
150 See id. at 980. 
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trial pipe overhanging a waterway is the prototypical image of a point 
source, the definition is far broader. For example, the act of dumping 
into a navigable waterway from something other than a discrete 
conveyance may also trigger liability, even where the dumping occurs. 
as a result of inadequate runoff control.151 Waste treatment ponds 
and lagoons, including water treatment systems collecting runoff and 
leachate, are not waters of the United States, and, as such, have been 
found to constitute point sources when they discharge into navigable 
waters.152 A comparison of the definitions of point source153 and dis-
charge of a pollutanV54 indicates that any discernible conveyance, 
including a vessel on internal waterways, will be considered a point 
source if pollutants are or may be discharged from the site.155 
b. Exemptions 
Congress has mandated that all point sources have permits.156 While 
the power to define point and nonpoint sources is vested in EPA and 
reviewable by the courts, EPA may not categorically exempt point 
sources from NPDES requirements.157 Exemptions from the NPDES 
framework may only be made by Congress.158 
Exemptions are viewed as anathema by the courts because they 
undermine the purpose of the Act.159 Exemptions could allow certain 
industries to lapse into inertia and to escape technology forcing. 160 
Further, exemptions might allow EPA and/or special interest groups 
to circumvent the legislative process.161 In support of such policies, 
151 See Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. Arcuri, 862 F. Supp. 73, 76 (dumping solid waste, 
wrecked or discarded equipment, garbage, rock, sand and dirt from a construction site into a 
creek triggers the definition of point source even where dumping occurs inadvertently as a 
result of inadequate runoff controls on the creek bank). 
152 See Law, 979 F.2d at 979 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (g» ("Waste treatment systems, including 
treatment ponds and lagoons designed to meet the requirements of [the Clean Water Act] ... 
are not waters of the United States"). 
153 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
154 See id. § 1362(12). 
155 See id. § 1362(12), (14). Vessels or floating craft discharging into the waters of the contigu-
ous zone or the ocean are excluded from the definition of "discharge of a pollutant." See id. 
§ 1362(12). 
156 See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. at 1376 n.17, 1381, 1382. 
160 See id. "An exemption tends to become indefinite: the problem drops out of sight, into a 
pool of inertia, unlikely to be recalled in the absence of crisis or a strong political protagonist." 
[d. at 1382. 
161 See NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382. 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declared 
that it contravenes the intent of the Clean Water Act and the struc-
ture of the statute itself "to exempt from regulation any activity that 
emits pollution from an identifiable point."162 
4. Navigable Waters 
Navigability in fact is not required for a body of water to constitute 
"navigable waters of the United States" under the Act.163 Reviewing 
courts considering whether a body of water constitutes "navigable 
waters" consistently have held that the Act envelops the Nation's 
waters under federal jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible 
under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.l64 Any 
agency interpretation narrowing the definition is in derogation of the 
Act and exceptions provided by a narrower definition are unlawful.165 
The definition of "navigable waters" is so broad that it encompasses 
wetlands,166 because the definition is not limited to only those waters 
that may convey interstate or foreign commerce.167 Further, agency 
jurisdiction over water may not be denied where the water has been 
separated from navigable waters by dikes or other structures, nor is 
jurisdiction limited to the historic tidal water line.168 In sum, courts 
have adhered to Congress's mandate that the term "navigable wa-
ters" be viewed in broad terms of U.S. geography and not be con-
stricted by interpretations of law.169 Courts have construed the term 
"navigable waters" in light of the Act's overriding purpose of facili-
tating protection of water quality.170 
Upon a judicial determination that a discharger has added a pollut-
ant to navigable waters from a point source in the absence of a 
162 See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (lOth Cir. 1979). The District 
of Columbia Circuit, in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, took issue with the Tenth 
Circuit's failure to distinguish between pollution and pollutant when defining a point source. 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
163 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165 & n.23. "All 
courts considering the issue have held that navigability in fact is not required." National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165 n.23. 
164 See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979); Leslie Salt Co. v. 
Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978); NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 
1975). 
165 See Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686. 
166 See Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1204. 
167 See Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686. 
168 See Leslie Salt, 578 F.2d at 756. 
169 See id. at 754-55 & n.15. 
170 See, e.g., id. at 755 n.15. 
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NPDES permit for that point source, i.e., that the previous four 
elements have been satisfied, then the discharger is liable for a viola-
tion of the Clean Water Act.17l In many instances, it is a simple 
determination.172 Whether the addition of the pollutant actually caused 
harm is irrelevant.173 Whether the discharger did not know that a 
permit was required for the activity is also irrelevant.174 The dis-
charger need only have engaged in the conduct that led to the Clean 
Water Act violation.175 
B. Where the Discharger Has a Permit, But Harm Results 
Unlike the situation where a discharger altogether lacks a permit, 
a more difficult question is presented to the courts where a discharger 
has a permit of some kind but the discharge nonetheless results in 
environmental harm. Understandably, if a discharger has obtained 
and complied fully with a NPDES permit, the discharger may not be 
charged with a violation of NPDES.176 The difficult determination, 
then, is whether a discharger has complied fully with the terms of the 
permit.177 A claim that a permit holder has not complied with the 
terms of the permit generally arises where the permit holder has 
discharged pollutants not authorized by the permit and/or where the 
permit holder has discharged pollutants in excess of the amounts 
authorized by the permit. 
1. Discharge of Pollutants Not Authorized by Permit Terms 
As set out in the previous subsection, courts have imputed liability 
to dischargers for failing to obtain a permit specific to the pollutant 
complained of.178 For example, hydroelectric facility operators with 
permits for discharges specific to their hydroelectric activities must 
obtain additional or modified NPDES permits to discharge any sub-
171 See, e.g., Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 13 
F.3d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1993). 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993). 
175 See id. 
176 See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 574 F.2d 367, 369-70 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that the 
permit holder is entitled to an absolute defense upon a demonstration of compliance with the 
permit). 
177 See id. at 370. 
178 See supra Section lILA. 
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stances not expressly listed in the permit.179 Courts have stated that 
even discharge of substances not specifically listed by EPA as pollut-
ants may invoke liability under the Clean Water Act if the discharger 
does not have a NPDES permit for the substances discharged. ISO Even 
a permit holder's mistaken interpretation of a permit will not absolve 
the permit holder from liability for an unauthorized discharge. lSI Be-
cause it is irrelevant to an assessment of a Clean Water Act violation 
whether an unauthorized discharge caused harm,ls2 the assignment of 
liability for those discharges not expressly allowed by a permit has 
generally been equal to that found for discharges that occurred in the 
complete absence of a permit.ls3 
2. Exceedances: Discharges in Excess of Quantities Authorized by 
Permit Terms 
There is little case law on the issue of what degree of liability may 
be triggered under the Clean Water Act by a permit holder's dis-
charge of pollutants of the type covered by the permit but in excess 
of the limits prescribed by the permit, i.e., exceedances. One of the 
most elucidating decisions on the matter is the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey's 1991 opinion in Public Inter-
est Research Group of New Jersey (NJPIRG) v. Yates Industries. l84 
NJPIRG brought suit against Yates Industries (Yates) for several 
thousand alleged violations of the Clean Water Act. ls5 In particular, 
NJPIRG alleged that Yates had discharged in excess of its permit 
terms and failed to monitor and report discharges in accordance with 
the permit terms.lS6 The court dealt brusquely with the charges of 
exceedances and other unpermitted discharges: 
[T]he fact remains that defendant's permit contains parameter 
restrictions [for the point source at issue], and that defendant has 
violated those parameters. Defendant is responsible for the terms 
179 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1988); 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
180 See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 581-82 (entrained fish); National Wildlife Fed'n v. 
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165 n.25 (sediment). 
181 See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993). 
182 See id. at 1530. 
183 See id. at 1529-30. 
184 See Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Yates Indus., 757 F. Supp. 438, 442 
(D.N.J. 1991). 
185 See id. 
186 See id. 
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of its permit, ... and violations of that permit are unlawful. 33 
U.S.C. § 1311(a). Unless modified, the permit as originally filed 
remains in effect.187 
According to the court, all excess discharges violate the Clean Water 
Act. l88 This conclusion is reinforced by "the fact that excess discharges 
during the same period for both 'average' and 'maximum' readings for 
a single substance leads to two separate violations."189 
Yates did not dispute the factual evidence of its discharges, but 
defended on the grounds that the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (DEP), which administered the SPDES pro-
gram, had advised the New Jersey Builders' Association that permits 
were not required for certain discharges, including the types of dis-
charges for which Yates was charged.H)() Unmoved, the court noted 
that DEP's letters to a third party do not enable the court to modify 
defendant's permit parameters when the defendant is charged with a 
violation of those parameters.l9l The court maintained that the DEP 
letters must have provided express instructions specific to defen-
dant's permit in order for them to provide a defense to compliance.192 
Express modification of the permit is required, stated the court, "par-
ticularly where the advice [given by the agency] runs directly counter 
to the clear terms of the permit."193 The court concluded that Yates' 
reliance on the DEP letters after the fact of its unpermitted dis-
charges was unreasonable.l94 
Yates next sought to defend by arguing that its exceedances would 
not violate the permit terms if the actual discharge rates were rounded 
off to the nearest significant digit.195 The court found this approach to 
be an absurd manipulation of the permitting mandate.196 In addition 
to noting that Yates was unable to cite authority for its position, the 
court declared: 
Regardless of how defendant attempts to couch the issue, ... a 
permit defines outer limits, not approximate tolerances. If this 
187Id. at 445. 
188 See id. at 445-52. 
189 See id. at 452 n.S. 
190 See Yates, 757 F. Supp. at 446. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193Id. 
194 See id. 
195 See Yates, 757 F. Supp. at 44~7. 
196 See id. at 447. 
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court were to follow defendant's logic, a reading of .249 on a 
substance limited to .2 units would not violate the permit, even 
though the reading exceeded the limit by nearly twenty-five per-
cent. This position is unsupportable .... Any amount over the 
discharge limit is in violation of the permit, and dischargers have 
a responsibility to report all excess effluents. Permit holders may 
not purposely avoid the intent of the parameters by rounding off 
figures to the nearest significant digit. 197 
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In order to ensure that its ruling would not be evaded, the court 
further admonished that it is impermissible for laboratory analysts to 
report discharge rates at rates rounded off to permit terms.198 
In awarding NJPIRG injunctive relief against Yates, the district 
court concluded that a defendant's violation of a permit's terms is 
sufficient to establish that harm has occurred, necessitating injunctive 
relief.199 
[V]iolation of an effluent standard under the Act presents strong 
evidence of irreparable harm, because permit parameters are "pre-
cisely that part of the [Act] which is foremost concerned with the 
'underlying substantive policy' of the environmental law: the pres-
ervation of the environment and the protection of mankind and 
wildlife from harmful chemicals."2°O 
The district court treated defendant's exceedance of the permit's 
parameters as a grave violation, and warned that dischargers are fully 
responsible for all exceedances at each point source.201 
EPA sets NPDES effluent limitation standards with the knowledge 
that exceedances cause harm.202 The Supreme Court has stated that 
Congress intended the standards set by EPA to be absolute prohibi-
tions on any non-conforming discharges, with the preferred standard 
as one prohibiting the discharge of pollutants.203 A discharge in com-
pliance with a permit, unless EPA erred in issuing the permit or in 
197 Id. at 447 & n.3. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 453-54. 
200 Yates, 757 F. Supp. at 454. 
201 See id. 
202 See E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135-37 (1977); Yates, 757 F. Supp. 
at 454-55; United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983). "A 
'standard of performance' is a 'standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which 
reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator [of EPA] determines 
to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology, ... 
including, where practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.''' E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 137 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1316). 
203 See E.!. du Pont de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 137. 
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setting a limitation, is assumed not to cause damage.204 Discharges 
beyond the bounds of a permit, whether exceedances or release of a 
pollutant not expressly listed in the permit, invoke liability for the 
resulting damage.205 
IV. ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. V. EASTMAN 
KODAK CO.: A CONTRARY VIEW OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCHARGES 
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has held that while exceedances are impermissible violations of the 
Act, the discharge of pollutants not authorized in a NPDES permit is 
lawful.206 In Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co. (hereinafter Kodak), the Second Circuit viewed as illogical 
the contention that NPDES permits establish limited permission for 
the discharge of pollutants listed in the permit and a prohibition on 
the discharge of any pollutant not listed.207 
Plaintiff Atlantic States Legal Foundation (Atlantic States) had 
brought suit against Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) charging Ko-
dak with violating the Clean Water Act by discharging pollutants 
which it was not authorized to discharge under its SPDES permit.208 
Kodak defended by stating that "discharges of pollutants not spe-
cifically limited in the SPDES Permit by an effluent limitation for the 
specified chemical does not violate either the Act or the SPDES 
Permit."209 The United States District Court for the Western District 
of New York acknowledged that exceedances of permit conditions are 
violations of the permit and of the Act,210 but cast the issue in the 
terms of Kodak's affirmative defense: 
Whether a permit prohibits only discharges of pollutants which it 
expressly restricts and only when they are discharged in excess 
of levels permitted in the permit, or whether a permit prohibits 
every single discharge except those in express compliance with 
the limits imposed by the permit.211 
204 See id. at 135-37; Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810-11. 
205 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 137; Yates, 757 F. Supp. at 443, 454-55; Chem-
Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810-11. 
206 See Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F. Supp. 1040, afl'd, 
12 F.3d 353, 354 (2d Cir. 1993). 
207 See Kodak, 12 F.3d at 357. 
208 See Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F. Supp. 1040, 1042. 
209 See id. at 1043 n.5. 
210 See id. at 1042, 1046. 
211 I d. at 1046. 
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The District Court for the Western District of New York determined 
that exceedances are permit violations punishable under the Act, but 
that discharges of unauthorized pollutants are beyond the scope of 
NPDES.212 The district court reasoned: 
[I]t strains all credulity to propose that Congress, having enacted 
such detailed legislation, and having authorized the EPA to adopt 
such detailed regulations, could have contemplated that a dis-
charge by a permit holder of a pollutant never even referenced in 
its permit would form the basis of a permit violation cognizable 
under [the Act].213 
In so concluding, the district court acknowledged that nowhere in the 
Act is there explicit support for a conclusion that unauthorized dis-
charges do not violate the Clean Water Act.214 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affir-
med, dismissing Atlantic State's "absolutist and wholly impractical 
view of a permit."215 The Second Circuit reasoned: 
Viewing the regulatory scheme as a whole ... it is clear that the 
permit is intended to identify and limit the most harmful pollut-
ants while leaving the control of the vast number of other pollut-
ants to disclosure requirements. Once within the NPDES or SPDES 
scheme, therefore, polluters may discharge pollutants not spe-
cifically listed in their permits so long as they comply with the 
appropriate reporting requirements and abide by any new limita-
tions when imposed on such pollutants.216 
For support in its conclusion, the Second Circuit, like Kodak itself, 
relied upon internal EPA memoranda and other statements by EPA.217 
The Second Circuit cited one EPA internal memorandum for the 
proposition that NPDES permits were not intended to encompass all 
pollutants a permittee might discharge: 
Compliance with [a permit that encompasses all possible pollut-
ants] would be impossible and anybody seeking to harass a per-
mittee need only analyze that permittee's discharge until deter-
mining the presence of a substance not identified in the permit.218 
212 See id. 
213 Kodak, 809 F. Supp. at 1046. 
214 See id. 
215 Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F. Supp. 1040, aff'd, 12 
F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1993). 
216 [d. 
217 See id. (relying on EPA statements in its holding); Kodak, 809 F. Supp. at 1043 (acknow-
ledging that Kodak relies "almost exclusively" on EPA internal memoranda). 
218 Kodak, 12 F.3d at 357 (citing Memorandum from EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator for 
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The court also relied upon EPA's 1980 comments to implementing 
application-based limits under the Clean Water Act reporting scheme.219 
Recognizing a regulatory gap, EPA commented: 
There is still some possibility ... that a [NPDES or SPDES] 
permittee may discharge a large amount of a pollutant not limited 
in its permit, and EPA will not be able to take enforcement action 
against the permittee as long as the permittee complies with the 
notification requirements [pursuant to the Clean Water Act].220 
Accordingly, the Second Circuit reasoned that any pollutants may be 
discharged so long as the discharger has a permit to discharge some 
pollutants and abides by annual reporting requirements.221 
In justification, the Second Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's 
expression in E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train of the judicial 
canon that a court need not find that an agency's interpretation of a 
statute is the only permissible interpretation, but a "sufficiently ra-
tional" interpretation so as to preclude the court from substituting its 
judgment for the agency's.222 The Second Circuit rested upon the E.!. 
du Pont de Nemours language where the Supreme Court stated: 
The purpose of [33 U.S.C. § 1342(k), which defines compliance 
with a NPDES permit as compliance with § 1311 for purposes of 
enforcement of the Clean Water Act] seems to be ... to relieve 
[permit holders] of having to litigate in an enforcement action the 
question [of] whether their permits are sufficiently strict.223 
This quote was taken out of context, however, and means the exact 
opposite of the purpose for which the Kodak court uses it.224 The full 
quote forbids deviation from permit standards in effect at the time of 
issuance and reads: 
[Section 1342(k)] plainly cannot allow deviations from [§ 1316] 
standards in issuing the permit. For, after standards of perform-
ance are promulgated, the permit can only be issued "upon condi-
tions that such discharge will meet ... all applicable requirements 
under [§ 1316]" [citing § 1342(a)(1)1; and one of the requirements 
Water Enforcement Jeffrey G. Miller to Regional Enforcement Director, Region V, at 2 (Apr. 
28, 1976». 
219 See id. at 358. 
220 [d. (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 33,516, 33,523 (1980». 
221 See id. at 354, 357-58. 
222 See id. at 358 (relying upon E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 
(1977». 
223 Kodak, 12 F.3d at 357 (quoting E.!. du Pont de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 138 n.28). 
224 See E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977). 
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of [§ 1316] is that no new source may operate in violation of 
any standard of performance. [Citing § 1316(e)]. The purpose of 
[§ 1342(k)] seems to be to insulate permit holders from changes 
in various regulations during the period of a permit and to relieve 
them of having to litigate in an enforcement action the question 
whether their permits are sufficiently strict. In short, [§ 1342(k)] 
serves the purpose of giving permits finality.225 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit later 
clarified this language of E.I. du Pont de Nemours: 
The language should be read to mean that a permit insulates the 
permit holder from any change in the regulation until the change 
is incorporated into the permit, and as a recognition that changes 
in the regulations, except for those prescribing standards for toxic 
pollutants injurious to human health, are not self-executing but 
must be placed in a permit before they can be enforced against a 
permit holder.226 
As further evidence in support of a firm judicial stance on strict 
permits, the ruling in E.I. du Pont de Nemours reversed a Court of 
Appeals ruling requiring EPA to allow permit variances.227 
V. THE PROSCRIPTIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS OF A 
VIOLATION OF THE ACT AND NPDES 
A NPDES permit states the pollutants and amounts of pollutants 
that a permittee may discharge at each of the permittee's point 
sources.228 The total prohibition against the discharge of pollutants 
into the Nation's waters may only be circumvented by possession of 
a NPDES permit.229 Not only is discharging in the absence of a permit 
a violation of the Clean Water Act, "[a]ny discharge of a pollutant not 
in compliance with the conditions or limitations of such permit is also 
unlawful."230 The District of Columbia Circuit in NRDC v. Castle, 
225 [d. 
226 Inland Steel Co. v. EPA, 574 F.2d 367, 373 (7th Cir. 1978). 
227 See E.!. du Pont de Nemours, 430 U.S. at 138 (reversing E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 
541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976». 
228 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). EPA may "issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or 
combination of pollutants" (indicating that permits are type and quantity specific). [d.; see also 
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 164--65 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States Steel 
Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey 
v. Yates Indus., 757 F. Supp. 438, 442 (D.N.J. 1991). 
229 NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
230 [d. 
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referring to the legislative history of the Act, enunciated that the 
Clean Water Act "is founded on the 'basic premise that a discharge 
of pollutants without a permit is unlawful and that discharges not in 
compliance with the limitations and conditions for a permit are unlaw-
ful."'231 The Sixth Circuit, in National Wildlife Federation v. Consum-
ers Power Co., explains: 
Where the source of a pollutant is a point source, and the pollutant 
is discharged into navigable waters, the source must obtain a 
[NPDES] permit limiting and controlling both the amount and 
type of pollutants which can lawfully be discharged .... EPA or 
an authorized state agency, may in its discretion exempt a specific 
pollutant discharge from [§ 1311's] general prohibition by issuing 
an NPDES permit. Alternatively, the agency may choose not to 
issue such a permit, leaving the discharge unlawful .... 232 
Although § 1342 reads that EPA "may issue a permit for the dis-
charge of any pollutant,"233 this grant of discretion only applies so as 
to allow EPA to either issue a permit or to leave the discharger 
subject to the total proscription of § 1311.234 
The Clean Water Act historically has imposed liability upon dis-
chargers for discharges that were not expressly allowed by a NPDES 
permit or which occurred in the complete absence of a permit.235 Even 
where defendants have assumed that their activities did not require 
a permit, courts have imputed liability to dischargers for failing to 
obtain a permit to discharge the specific pollutant complained of,236 
thereby illustrating that permits place express limits, by type and lJy 
quantity, on the discharge of pollutants.237 
231 [d. at 1375 n.16 (citations omitted). 
232 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1988). 
233 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(I). 
234 NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375. 
235 See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 583, 585 (finding that entrained fish discharged by dam 
are pollutants under the Clean Water Act since they are "biological materials"); National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (declaring that sediment 
discharged by a dam is a pollutant under the Clean Water Act, although it is not clearly listed 
by the EPA as such); United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110--11 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
gasoline is a pollutant under the Clean Water Act even though not expressly covered by the 
Act). 
236 See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 583, 585; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 l'~. 
at 174 n.56; Hamel, 551 F.2d at 110--11. 
237 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311; Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Yates Indus., 757 
F. Supp. 438, 445 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that "[u]nless modified, the permit as originally filed 
remains in effect," "and violations of that permit are unlawful. ... Mere verbal representations 
by officials that certain portions of a permit will not be enforced, without formal modification in 
the permit, will not excuse the holder from the terms of that permit."). 
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If both reporting requirements and effluent limitations are included 
in a specific permit, compliance with reporting requirements may not 
be equated with compliance with effluent limitations.238 The distinc-
tion between the two is reiterated by § 1319(c), which distinguishes 
criminal penalties for a violation of any permit condition or limitation 
from penalties for providing false or inaccurate information in re-
sponse to any reporting requirements.239 In Public Interest Research 
Group of New Jersey v. Yates Industries, the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey explained, "The purpose of 
sanctions for reporting violations is to encourage accurate records so 
that plaintiffs can discover violations."240 While reports filed by dis-
chargers are deemed admissions of liability in summary judgment 
motions,241 they do not supplant the requirements and penalties of the 
NPDES permitting program.242 
VI. ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. v. EASTMAN 
KODAK CO.: A MISGUIDED JUDICIAL APPROACH TO NPDES 
AND CLEAN WATER ACT VIOLATIONS 
A. Judicial Deference 
Rather than deferring to a "sufficiently rational" EPA interpreta-
tion of ho'W unpermitted discharges are to be treated, in Kodak, the 
~econd Cir'cuit contravened the case law and relied upon EPA state-
ments taken out of context in order to create an indicia of deference 
to a preposterous statutory construction.243 Had the statute and the 
common law not been so explicit, the Second Circuit might have been 
correct in looking to E.!. du Pont de Nemours for guidance on judicial 
deference to the EPA statements. In E.!. du Pont de Nemours, the 
Supreme Court declared that an agency's interpretation is to be ac-
corded judicial deference when states and other affected parties have 
relied upon it and it is supported by thorough, scholarly, judicial opin-
238 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). Contra Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1993); see Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States 
"PA, 822 F.2d 104, 118-119 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
239 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-{2). 
240 See Yates, 757 F. Supp. at 452. 
241 See id. at 447. 
242 See id. at 447, 450-52. 
243 See Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 
1993) (relying upon E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977». 
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ions.244 Yet, even under the principles of E.!. du Pont de Nemours, the 
Second Circuit's reliance upon certain EPA comments is ill founded.245 
A more appropriate vehicle for treating Kodak's proffered EPA 
comments would have been the Chevron doctrine.246 The Chevron 
doctrine enunciates the principle that a statute's construction must be 
derived from a review of congressional intent if the statute is not plain 
on its face: '''If the intent of Congress is clear that is the end of the 
matter."'247 If a statute is ambiguous on its face and the legislative 
history does not speak to the issue, then the Chevron doctrine dictates 
that a court defer to a reasonable interpretation by the agency.248 
While the Western District of New York relied upon Chevron to 
validate its interpretations of Kodak's proffered EPA documents,249 it 
also noted that § 1311 is plain on its face.250 The Second Circuit did not 
address these assertions of the district court in its affirmance, but it 
is possible that the Second Circuit was adhering in spirit to Justice 
Scalia's since-proposed manipulation of the Chevron doctrine.251 
Under any possible interpretation of the Chevron doctrine, how-
ever, the Second Circuit's "deference" to EPA's interpretation of the 
Clean Water Act is misplaced. The Clean Water Act is an unambigu-
ous mandate barring discharges of pollutants from point sources in 
the absence of a NPDES permit specific to the discharge.252 The 
legislative history and two decades of common law do not veer from 
this mandate.253 Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit has held that the Agency's interpretation 
must be consistent with the Agency's past actions on the same issue.254 
The Second Circuit's citations to EPA memoranda effects a gross 
deviation from EPA's congressionally mandated role under the Clean 
Water Act.255 
244 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135-37 (1977). 
245 See Kodak, 12 F.3d at 357-58. 
246 See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
247 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.34, at 701-02 (3d ed. 1991) (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). 
248 See id. 
249 See Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 809 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 
(W.D.N.Y. 1992). 
250 See id. at 1044. 
251 See Schwartz, supra note 247, at 702-03 (quoting INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
454 (1987». 
252 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311; see also infra Sections III.A-B. 
253 See infra Sections II., IILA-B. 
254 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
255 See generally id. 
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has asserted in Louisiana Chemi-
cal Association v. Bingham that "the role of the agencies remains 
basically to execute legislative policy, they are no more authorized 
than are the courts to rewrite acts of Congress."256 Similar to E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Chevron, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit has propounded that "construction of a statute 
by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there 
are compelling indications that it is wrong .... "257 There are compel-
ling indications that the Kodak courts' reliance upon the EPA's inter-
nal memoranda and comments in the Federal Register is wrong258-
the overarching indication being the EPA's history of issuing and 
enforcing pollutant-specific NPDES permits.259 This history has been 
the subject of reliance and has been supported by thorough scholarly 
judicial opinions.26o 
B. No Visible Support in the Case Law 
The source of the Second Circuit's holding in Kodak is not visible 
in the case law. The Second Circuit's reasoning in Kodak may find 
support in dicta in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, which 
states that "EPA's policy-oriented explanation for the distinction-
that Congress purposely limited the federal NPDES permit program 
to certain well-recognized pollutants and left control of other water-
altering substances or conditions to the states ... -is quite plausi-
ble."261 However, the National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch court 
was likely referring to the prohibition on including general federal 
water quality standards in NPDES permits, while state water quality 
standards are included and serve as additional grounds for liability.262 
256 Louisiana Chern. Ass'n v. Bingham, 657 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Talley v. 
Matthews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977». 
257 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988). 
258 See id.; Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357-58 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
259 See Kodak, 12 F.3d at 357 (acknowledging plaintiff Atlantic State's citations to cases where 
defendants failed to accurately disclose discharges or where defendants failed to secure an 
applicable permit); Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 583, 585 ; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 
693 F.2d 156, 174 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110-11 (6th Cir. 
1977). 
260 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135-37; Kodak, 12 F.3d at 357; 
Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 583, 585; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174 
n.56; Hamel, 551 F.2d at 110-11; see also supra Section III.A-B. 
261 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 172. 
262 See id. 
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The National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch opinion also might be 
construed mistakenly to support Kodak's proposition where the for-
mer states that EPA had been entrusted by Congress with "some 
discretion over which 'pollutants' and sources of pollutants were to be 
regulated under the NPDES program."263 Rather than the free-for-all 
suggested by the Kodak court, however, the National Wildlife Fed-
eration v. Gorsuch court's statement, taken in context, simply means 
that for point sources such as dams, EPA has the discretion to con-
strue a dam's alteration of water quality, such as an alteration with 
oxygen content, as not constituting pollution requiring a permit.264 
C. Reporting Requirements Are Distinct 
The Second Circuit also erred in equating a discharger's compliance 
with reporting requirements with compliance with effluent limit a-
tions.265 The distinction between the two is reiterated by § 1319(c), 
which distinguishes criminal penalties for violation of a permit condi-
tion from penalties for providing false or inaccurate information in 
response to any reporting requirements under the chapter.266 At least 
one court has noted that the purpose of sanctions for reporting viola-
tions is to enable plaintiffs and prosecutors to discover discharge 
violations.267 It is significant that discharge reports may constitute 
admissions of liability in summary judgment motions.268 In contradic-
tion to the reasoning of the Second Circuit, discharge reports do not 
supplant the requirements and penalties of the NPDES permitting 
program.269 
D. The Implications of Atlantic States Legal 
Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 
lf a permit holder is deemed to have blanket authorization to dis-
charge so long as he or she complies with reporting requirements, 
EPA's enforcement authority is hobbled because permit holders may 
263 [d. at 173. 
264 See id. at 171 nA 7, 173. 
265 Contra Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2d 
Cir. 1993); see NRDC v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 118-119 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
266 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-(2). 
267 Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Yates Indus., 757 F. Supp. 438, 452 
(D.N.J.1991). 
268 See id. at 447. 
269 See id. at 447, 450-52. 
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discharge with impunity. Alternatively, if a permit holder is deemed 
to be in compliance with his or her permit by reporting only author-
ized discharges (and by omitting unauthorized discharges), then EPA 
is barred from discovering, much less prosecuting, unauthorized dis-
charges-if there is, then, such a thing as an unauthorized discharge. 
The Second Circuit's holding in Kodak is not a plausible interpretation 
ofthe Clean Water Act.270 Kodak is an anomaly. No other federal court 
has cited to the Second Circuit's central holding in Kodak. The Second 
Circuit's conclusion is self-contradicting: it recognizes a discharger's 
liability for failure to obtain a NPDES permit as well as liability for 
exceedances, but refuses to impose liability where a permittee failed 
to obtain a permit for the discharge of pollutants not allowed in the 
NPDES permit.271 Although the defendant's efforts in Kodak to raise 
the defense that possession of a permit absolved Kodak of all dis-
charges is not surprising, the Second Circuit's willingness to adopt a 
position that would have the effect of overriding congressional intent 
and nullifying the Clean Water Act is shocking. 
VII. ARGUMENT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CERCLA 
AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Violations of NPDES may also be punishable under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA).272 Designed to complement existing federal regulations,273 
CERCLA supplements the Clean Water Act by imposing additional 
liability for a violation of the Clean Water Act.274 In amending the 
Clean Water Act, Congress was concerned that if pollution control 
were limited to NPDES permitting alone, the Act would control "only 
a part of the total 'toxic pollutant picture' for a given industrial site 
270 Compare Kodak, 12 F.3d at 357 with 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1342. 
271 See Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353, 354, 357 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
272 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, codified as 
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(1986) [hereinafter CERCLAl; United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 
1541 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986). 
273 United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (quoting 126 
CONGo REC. Hll,787, H11,801 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)). 
274 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809; United States V. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 
F. Supp. 1100, 1115--16 (D. Minn. 1982); 126 CONGo REC. S14,965 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) 
(statement of Senator Randolph, Chairman, Committee on Environment and Public Works). 
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or process," and that such incomplete coverage would "undermine 
overall water pollution abatement efforts."275 
That CERCLA's scope includes Clean Water Act violations is also 
supported by the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota, which asserted in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical 
Corp. that 
CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction. The 
statute should not be narrowly interpreted to frustrate the gov-
ernment's ability to respond promptly and effectively, or to limit 
the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the 
limits expressly provided .... Congress intended to provide the 
EPA with flexibility to tailor response actions to fit the circum-
stances of the individual case.276 
Additionally, the national contingency plan set out in the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, of which the Clean Water Act is a part, 
forms the basis for the national contingency plan of CERCLA.277 
VIII. RELEVANT STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
BACKGROUND OF CERCLA 
A. Liability under CERCLA 
Under CERCLA, current and former owners of a facility,278 gener-
ators of hazardous substances,279 and transporters of hazardous sub-
stances280 are liable for response costs and natural resource damages 
caused by a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance.281 
CERCLA imposes strict liability.282 Congress established this stand-
ard while aware of the difficulties that occur when several potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs) have contributed to a site's contamination, 
or "when dumped chemicals react with others to form new or more 
toxic substances, or when records are unavailable."283 Nonetheless, 
275 S. REP. No. 95-370, at 52 (1977). 
276 Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112, 1114. 
277 See id. at 1115--16. See RODGERS, supra note 38, at 700-10, for a detailed discussion ofthe 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The NCP is a loosely 
organized federal effort incorporating Superfund and other environmental clean-up efforts for 
preparing for and responding to discharges and releases of pollutants, contaminants, and haz-
ardous substances. See id. at 701. 
278 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2). 
279 See id. § 9607(a)(3). 
280 See id. § 9607(a)(4). 
281 See id. 
282 See United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
283 I d. at 805--06. 
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Congress decided that "those responsible for causing the problems 
caused by the hazardous wastes were intended to bear the costs and 
responsibilities for remedying the condition."284 Congress anticipated 
that CERCLA would respond to toxic waste sites even where the 
dangers of the toxins were unknown.285 
B. Defenses to CERCLA Liability 
1. Enumerated Defenses 
CERCLA provides certain enumerated defenses to liability.286 A 
party will not be held liable where the damages were caused solely 
by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third 
party other than an employee or contractor of the defendant, if the 
defendant exercised due care; and (4) any combination of the above.287 
2. Federally Permitted Releases 
CERCLA's exception for "federally permitted releases" is the other 
statutory defense available to a discharger.288 It is also the only equi-
table defense to CERCLA liability.289 The discharge of pollutants 
specifically permitted by a permit constitutes a "federally permitted 
release."290 To maintain a defense that a release was federally permit-
ted, the terms of the discharger's permit must be legally enforce-
able.291 An assertion that a discharge is permitted by implication does 
not constitute a legally enforceable permit of that discharge.292 
A discharger who complies with his or her permit but whose fed-
erally permitted release causes damage may not be held liable under 
the Clean Water Act or CERCLA.293 
284 [d.; see also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 
1982). 
285 Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp.1269, 1276 (D. Del. 
1987). 
286 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). 
287 See id. 
288 See id. § 9607(j). The term "federally permitted release" includes those state permitted 
releases made pursuant to a SPDES permit. See id. § 9601(10). 
289 See In Re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893, 899 n.15, 901 (D. Mass. 
1989) (Acushnet VII); S. REP. No. 96-848, at 46 (1980). 
290 See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986); see also United States 
v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1541 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
291 See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 47 (1980). 
292 See id. 
293 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)-(d); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 699 F. Supp. 
827, 832 (D. Idaho 1987), afI'd, 882 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1989); Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 673. 
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In In Re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor (hereinafter Acush-
net VII), the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts held that the only equitable defense which may be main-
tained against the government in a combined CERCLAIClean Water 
Act action is one where the releases allowed by the permit were the 
direct cause of the harm, even though the defendant had complied 
with the NPDES permit.294 The Acushnet VII holding295 defines fed-
erally permitted releases as only those discharges that conform to the 
exact type and amount of pollutants limited in the NPDES permit.296 
In enacting CERCLA, Congress maintained that "Congress has 
never said or suggested that a Federal permit amounts to a license 
to create threats to public health or the environment with legal im-
munity."297 Federally permitted releases must be reviewed in light of 
the congressional mandate to safeguard the environment.298 
C. A Defendant's Burden of Proof 
A defendant faced with liability under CERCLA bears the burden 
of proving that he or she falls within the statutory exception of 
§ 9607(j) - Federally Permitted Releases.299 This allocation of the bur-
den of proof conforms to the broad remedial purposes of the statute 
and Congress's interest in apportioning liability.30o A discharger with 
a NPDES permit may defend a CERCLA action on the basis that the 
harm alleged is attributable solely to federally permitted releases in 
spite of the discharger's non-permitted releases, or that the non-per-
mitted releases are not a contributing factor to the harm.30l Plaintiffs 
in CERCLA actions are not required to prove that the non-federally 
permitted releases are "substantial" contributing factors to the harm.302 
294 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 722 F. Supp. 893, 899 n.15, 
901 (D. Mass. 1989) (Acushnet VII). 
295 Ruling on the parties' summary judgment motions, the Acushnet VII court expressed 
"diffidence" at releasing its "working hypothesis on the issue of federally permitted releases" 
but did so in consideration of ''the paucity of decided case on these issues" and in order that the 
opinion might be subject to judicial and scholarly critique to aid in the final resolution of the 
case. [d. at 895 n.l. The case subsequently was settled by consent decree. See United States v. 
AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 111 (1st Cir. 1992). 
296 See Acushnet VII, 722 F. Supp. at 895-90l. 
297 S. REP. No. 96--848, at 46 (1980). 
298 See id. 
299 See Acushnet VII, 722 F. Supp. at 901 n.2l. 
300 See id.; see also S. REP. No. 96--848, at 46 (1980). 
301 See Acushnet VII, 722 F. Supp. at 897 & n.ll. 
302 See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n.4 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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The burden is on the defendant to establish, by a fair preponderance 
of the evidence, that the damage is divisible between the permitted 
and non-permitted releases.303 The defendant also must prove what 
portion of the damages is allocable to federally permitted releases.304 
A defendant's failure to sustain this burden of proof subjects the 
defendant to liability for the entire, indivisible harm, in accordance 
with traditional tort law principles.305 This allocation of the burden of 
proof reflects "Congress' concern that cleanup efforts not be held 
hostage to the time-consuming and almost impossible task of tracing 
all of the waste found at a dump site."306 
D. Recovery under CERCLA 
1. Where the Discharge Constitutes a Federally Permitted Release 
Where response costs307 are incurred by damage resulting from a 
federally permitted release, the sovereign's308 recovery for response 
costs is determined by "existing law in lieu of [§ 9607 of CERCLA]."309 
In other words, state common law determines recovery for any dam-
ages resulting from permitted releases.3lo Under the statutory scheme 
of CERCLA, dischargers are held liable under state common law for 
their federally permitted releases because "[t]he rule of common law 
is that compliance with a permit is not a defense to liability."311 
303 See Acushnet VII, 722 F. Supp. at 901. 
304 See id. This burden is placed on defendants because to do otherwise would be to force 
plaintiffs to prove, as part of their prima facie case, that defendants had been issued no relevant 
permits. This would impede suits by citizen groups and parties other than the EPA. See id. at 
901 n.21. 
305 Thomas v. Fag Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (WD. Mo. 1994) (citing W KEETON 
ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 267 (5th ed. 1984); United States 
v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 875; PROSSER at 315-316). 
306 See O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179 nA. 
307 The Supreme Court of California has declared that although CERCLA expressly distin-
guishes between response costs and recovery for natural resource damages, they do not require 
distinct treatment by the courts: "[W]e do not believe ... that CERCLA intended that reim-
bursement of 'response costs' be treated as definitionally or conceptually distinct from recovery 
of 'damages.' Congress clearly intended considerable overlap between the two forms of recov-
ery." AID Ins. Co. v. FMC Corp., 799 P.2d 1253, 1270 (Cal. 1990). 
308 The sovereign may be the federal government, a state government, or any Native Ameri-
can tribe. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j). 
309 [d. 
310 See id.; Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D. Idaho 1986) (upholding state's 
nuisance claim for damages due to permitted release); S. REP. No. 96-848, at 46 (1980). 
311 S. REP. No. 96-848, at 46 (1980). 
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2. CERCLA Actions for Damages Resulting from Clean Water 
Act Violations 
Where a discharger violates a NPDES permit, CERCLA will im-
pute liability for response costs. Courts have allowed claims for re-
covery under CERCLA, regardless of whether the discharger has a 
NPDES permit, for any releases: (1) which occurred during a time 
when there was no permit; or (2) which were not expressly allowed 
by the permit; or (3) which exceeded the limitations established by 
the permit.312 Such releases constitute non-federally permitted re-
leases.313 Where damage may be traced to federally permitted re-
leases, response costs and natural resource damages are not recover-
able unless non-federally permitted releases contributed to the cost 
of the natural injury.314 
IX. CONCLUSION: CERCLA RECOVERY FOR CLEAN 
WATER ACT VIOLATIONS 
Violations of the Clean Water Act for discharges in the absence of 
a permit, where the discharger either wholly lacks a permit or a 
permit specific to the pollutant at issue, subject the discharger to 
CERCLA liability, because such discharges do not constitute feder-
ally permitted releases.315 The rulings in cases such as Iron Mountain 
Mines and Bunker Hill make clear that a violation of the Clean Water 
Act is also a violation of CERCLA.316 
Congress was concerned with national uniformity in pollution con-
trol and in enacting CERCLA sought to prevent hazardous waste 
generators or handlers from taking advantage of a state's less strin-
gent disposal laws to the detriment of the national goal.317 The Clean 
Water Act also reflects this concern for "equal treatment for similarly 
situated dischargers."318 Lax permits issued by some SPDES pro-
312 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1541 (E.D. Cal. 1992); 
Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 673-74. 
313 See Iron Mountain Mines, 812 F. Supp. at 1541; Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 673-74. 
314 See Iron Mountain Mines, 812 F. Supp. at 1540 (citing In re Acushnet River & New 
Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893, 897 (D. Mass. 1989) (Acushnet VIl). 
315 See Iron Mountain Mines, 812 F. Supp. at 1541; Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 673-74; see 
also United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States 
v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1115--16 (D. Minn. 1982). 
316 See Iron Mountain Mines, 812 F. Supp. at 1541; Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 673-74; see 
also Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809; Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1115-16. 
317 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808-09. 
318 S. REP. No. 95-370, at 73 (1977). 
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grams or EPA's arbitrary issuance of inclusive permits to some dis-
chargers and less stringent permits to others would undermine na-
tional pollution control policy.319 Implicitly permitting discharge of a 
hazardous substance would be contrary to congressional intent and 
the language of both Acts, because the result would be a lack of 
national uniformity regarding which hazardous substances would re-
quire a permit and which would not.320 Lack of specificity in permits 
would trigger litigation and uncertainty over which discharges are 
permitted by a permit.321 The incentive for obtaining a comprehensive 
permit and the national goal of pollution control would be simultane-
ously abrogated if permittees were allowed to discharge pollutants 
not specified in their permits.322 The overarching legislative support 
for these propositions is exemplified by the remarks of Senator Ran-
dolph, a sponsor of CERCLA: "There is simply no good reason for us 
to respond to one type of release of a poison but not [to] another."323 
319 See id.; Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809. 
320 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809; S. REP. No. 95-370, at 73 (1977). 
321 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
322 See id. 
323 See 126 CONGo REC. SI4,967, S14,967 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). 
